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ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION OF THE MARITAL
COMMUNITY: INTEGRATION OR DISINTEGRATION?
BROCKMAN ADAMS*
Prior to 1948 it was immediately apparent that any discussion of
federal estate and gift taxation had to be divided into the two cate-
gories of community property and common law Though an obvious
attempt has been made to eliminate the major differences in tax treat-
ment of the two systems,' there are still many distinctions which do
not meet the eye on a casual reading of the statute. The average prac-
titioner, and for that matter the average "tax lawyer," does not have
time to explore the technicalities of the new marital deduction "equal-
izer" let alone suggest necessary revisions. This article is written in
an attempt to show that many distinctions are still present in the
statute, many faults and traps for the unwary can develop even in
community property states, and that perhaps we should all be thinking
of alternative solutions to the problem beyond the present geographic
compromise. It is now, rather than after judicial decisions have solidi-
fied the statutory pattern, that action should be taken.
The new marital deduction system is best approached by a short
review of community property tax history since the present Internal
Revenue Code's basic premise is to equalize taxation among the states
by making the community property concepts of split gifts and split
estates available to married couples living in common law states.2 With
this in mind a logical development of the subject of federal estate and
gift taxation seems to be first, to examine the community property tax
background, second, to analyze the present tax structure, and third, to
suggest a logical revision. Any such revision must be simple enough to
be readily absorbed into the present Revenue Code without greatly
upsetting established judicial concepts, and yet must lead to perma-
nent tax improvements. I believe this can best be accomplished by
revising the "marital deduction" sections of the code so as to improve
the present methods of taxing the marital community while testing
the new principles of integrated federal estate and gift taxation.
* Member of the Washington Bar.
1 IN . REv. CODE § 812(e).
2INT. Rav. CODE §§ 1000(f), 812(e), 1004(a) (3), see also SEN. REP. No. 1013,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), and 94 CONcG. REc. 3498.
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COMMUNITY PROPERTY BACKGROUND
A. The Pre-1942 Estate Tax.
The struggle between community property spouses and the treasury
department over federal estate and gift taxation can be divided into
a series of rough historical divisions each highlighted by a key case.
These cases, rather than the statute, are the basis for taxation of com-
munity property spouses and form a background which explains the
system used in the present statute.8
The first appearance of community property before the Supreme
Court of the United States pre-dates the first federal income and estate
tax statutes which may account for the system's resistance to full ap-
plication of these taxes.' For about the first ten years after community
property first appeared before the United States Supreme Court liti-
gation involving it was concerned with whether community property
in the United States should follow the French5 or the Spanish System.'
To a certain extent this confusion exists today and may still rise to
plague taxpayers." During this period there was no federal tax litiga-
tion involving community property, but it is interesting to note that
tax litigation within the community property states had resulted in the
states being able to tax the whole community estate as belonging to the
husband.' At the present time the U.S. community property systems
seem to be thought of more as creatures of statute rather than histori-
cal derivations from France and Spain. This proposition is not free
from doubt, but a detailed analysis of the subject is beyond the scope
of this paper.
s Community property is conspicuous by its absence from the taxtng provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code, being covered only by the general provisions of INT. Rxv.
CODE § 811 (a) and some provisions applying to the transitional period from 1942 to
1948.
4 Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484 (1900).5 Arett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311 (1911)-giving the wife only an expectancy in the
marital property.0 Garrozz v. Dasta, 204 U.S. 64 (1907)-indicating the Spanish system gave the
wife a vested interest in the property. There is some doubt as to whether this distinc-
tion is correct. See note 7, infra.
7Nevada and New Mexico seem to only have an expectancy in the wife. Her-
nandez v. Becker, 54 F 2d 542 (C.A. 10th 1931), Telegraphic Ruling of September
30, 1948 signed D. S. Bliss, Deputy Comnussionery (not printed in the Cumulative
Bulletin). See 3 P-H TAx SEv. 76,406 (1948), Cf. Estate of Paul Wendenhoeck v.
Commissioner, 4 T.C. 124 (1944) for French; Estate of Jose Simon v. Commissioner,
40 B.T.A. 651 (1939) for Spanish.
8 Moffitt v. Kelley, 218 U.S. 401 (1910). California probably did not have true
community property at that time, but the court treated the situation as though it
involved a valid community property sysem. See United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S.
315 (1926).
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There is no written evidence of the Treasury's attitude on the mat-
ter from 1900 through 1917 but somehow the Treasury became con-
vinced that the community property estate could be split for estate tax
purposes.' The Treasury suddenly became aware that the theories of
splitting the community estate could be carried over into the income
tax field and the fight was on. At first, the Treasury tried to prevent a
splitting of community income for income tax purposes;'" however in
1920 the federal authorities seemed to feel they had to concede that
community property income was the same as income from a partner-
ship and could thus be split for tax purposes." The courts strength-
ened the community property states' position in this matter by declar-
ing that individual state concepts of community property ownership
should be followed. 2 Since this splitting was done by statutory mter-
pretation of the federal tax law, the Treasury unsuccessfully attempted
to have the statute changed."3 Thus by 1922 community property con-
cepts had successfully edged their way into the federal tax law
As might be expected the Treasury was not satisfied with this
geographical inequality of federal taxation, and the third historical
period begins with the Treasury directing its efforts toward an attack
on the community property spouses via the individual state laws
relying on Wardell v. Blum" as authority that the individual state
laws should be applied. This attack is evidenced by a series of Treas-
ury Decisions taking first one position and then another, culminating
with Attorney General Stone's famous T.D 3670 which stated that
California spouses could not split their income for tax purposes.' The
Treasury's decision was upheld by the Supreme Court so far as Cali-
fornia community property was concerned.' The Treasury also de-
feated California taxpayers on the split estate question." Since the
Treasury was admittedly using a state by state basis, the other com-
munity property states were not specifically covered by this decision.
The Treasury served notice, however, that all the other states would
9 T.D. 2450, February 1917 (not published)
1o O.D. 347, 1 CuM. BULL. 189 (1919), later modified by O.D. 426, 2 CuM. BULL.
198 (1919).
"T.D. 3071, 3 CUM. BULL. 221 (1920), T.D. 3138, 4 CuM. BULL. 238 (1921).
12 Wardell v. Blum, 270 Fed. 309 (1920), certiorari denied 258 U.S. 617 (1922).
Is Seidman, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 816 (1st
Ed. 1938).
14 Supra, note 12.
15 Cf. T.D. 3569, 111-1 Cum. BULL. 91 (1924), T.D. 3596 Ill-1 CUM. BULL. 101
(1924), T.D. 3670, IV-1 CuM. BULL. 19 (1925).
16 United States v. Robbins, 269 U.S. 315 (1926).
1? United States v. Talcott, 23 F 2d 897 (C.A. 9th 1928), but see Estate of George
Burlitt v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 1158 (1926) for Texas.
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be similarly examined."8 The climax to this litigation occurred in 1930,
and the result was a complete victory for community property spouses
in Poe v. Seaborn and its companion cases. 9 These cases all involved
income tax splitting, but the case of Hernandez v. Becker,"0 while not
allowing spouses in New Mexico to split their estates, clearly indicated
that the concepts of income splitting allowed under Poe v. Seaborn
also would allow community property spouses to split their estates for
tax purposes."- Thus the period from 1922 to 1932 ends with the
United States Supreme Court firmly establishing community property
concepts in the framework of the federal tax law. It should be ob-
served, however, that none of these decisions was based on a lack of
Congressional power to tax the whole estate, but on the Congressional
intent to tax from use of the words "income of an individual." (Italics
added.)
After the community property spouses had established that their
state laws were sufficient to protect the basic idea of split estates, the
Treasury tried to overturn the basic premise of Wardell v. Blum on
the theory that state laws should not govern federal tax questions.2"
Concurrently, taxation of the command over income theory, as estab-
lished in Corliss v. Bowers"5 and Lucas v. Earl,"' was used in an
attempt to tax the command which the community property husband
has over the community income. In the estate tax field the commis-
sioner declared that the community property husband's estate should
be considered as containing the whole of the community estate because
he held a power of revocation as the complete manager of the commu-
nity estate. 8 After a few preliminary successes, the Treasury was
again completely defeated when the Supreme Court declared that com-
munity property was a separate concept not governed by the ordinary
rules of federal taxation developed in non-community property situa-
1835 Ops. Aiy GEN. 265 (1927).
19282 U.S. 101 (1930); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930), Goodell v. Kock,
282 U.S. 118 (1930), Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930). California had changed
its statute and also qualified. See United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931).
20 54 F 2d 542 (C.A. 10th 1931).
21 See note 7, supra, for authorities.22The Commissioner had been successful on this point in fields other than com-
munity property litigation. Burnett v. Hamel, 287 U.S. 102 (1932). The question of
state versus federal law in the tax field is still in doubt. Cf. Morgan v. Commis-
sioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1939), Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1936), Bennett v.
Scofield, 170 F 2d 887 (C.A. 10th 1948).
28281 U.S. 376 (1930).
2-281 U.S. 111 (1930).23 Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436 (1933) established this in the now com-
munity property field. Cf. Bank of America v. Commissioner, 90 F 2d 981 (C.A. 9th
1937) for a Treasury victory on this point.
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tions. By 1938 community property was not only established as a valid
tax concept, but was protected from many of the usual doctrines cre-
ating tax liability These 1938 cases and their immediate successors
mark a breakoff point between the established concepts of community
property taxation and the undeveloped areas because the time between
1938 and 1942 when a new statute for the taxation of community
property was passed was too short to allow any new principles to
completely develop.
After 1938 the Commissioner once again started the cycle of litiga-
tion based on non-community property principles of taxation and con-
tinued appeals to Congress to change the law The Commissioner had
started several very successful lines of attack when the need for such
attacks was removed by Congress changing the law in 1942 so as to
completely (and in fact unfairly) tax the community estate. These
fields of litigation opened by the Commissioner are extremely impor-
tant to estate planners today since the Revenue Act of 194827 has
restored community property taxation to this pre-1942 basis. The
Commissioner's approach during this 1938-1942 period, in both the
income and estate tax fields, was to examine each marital community
to see whether the property was held as separate or community prop-
erty This involved intricate questions of fact, and almost certain liti-
gation, in which the Commissioner was quite successful." Closely con-
nected with this approach was the Commissioner's use of the joint
property section of the Internal Revenue Code, § 811(e), to tax the
entire estate to the husband by showing that the property was held as
"joint" and not "community" property 2" This accusation of joint
property control can be coupled with a doctrine of estoppel to make
the taxpayer's burden of proof very difficult.2 An additional method
used by the Commissioner was based on the fact that the community
property husband's life governs possession and enjoyment in the wife,
which would make the entire estate taxable to the husband under
26 Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938), United States v. Goodyear, 99
F 2d 523 (C.A. 9th 1938).
27 Pub. L. No. 471, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (passed April 2, 1948 over a presidential
veto), 62 Stat. 110 (1948).
28 Sparkman v. Commissioner, 112 F 2d 774 (C.A. 9th 1940), Beals v. Fontenot,
111 F 2d 956 (C.A. 5th 1940), Van Every v. Commissionery, 108 F 2d 650 (C.A.
9th 1940)
29 United States v. Pierotti, 154 F 2d 758 (C.A. 9th 1946), Greenwood v. Com-
missioner, 134 F 2d 915 (C.A. 9th 1943), Homer v. Commissioner, 130 F 2d 915
(C.A. 9th 1952), Bank of America v. Rogan, 33 F Supp. 183 (N.D. Cal. 1940).
30 Estate of George Kingdon, 9 T.C. 838 (1947).
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Helvering v. Hallock." This flew directly in the face of Lang v. Com-
missioner," and the Commissioner was not successful in his first
approach to the matter.33 But this was not fully developed due to the
passage of the 1942 Revenue Act, and its possibilities of future suc-
cess are unknown. The Commissioner was also re-examining commu-
nity property insurance assets and attempting to tax them completely
to the husband through an "incidents of ownership" test which had
been written into the regulations. This was rejected by the United
States Supreme Court in the Lang case because the regulations were
not warranted by any language in the statute; however, the "incidents
of ownership" test was written into the statute by the Revenue Act
of 1942 and still remains in today's Internal Revenue Code. This
would mean that all insurance paid for with community property pro-
ceeds would be taxable to the spouse dying first and especially to the
husband if he predeceased his wife."'
The above situations illustrating the 1938-1942 period are by no
means exhaustive, but they do serve to point out the extremely unset-
tled condition of federal taxation in the community property field
since in 1942 federal taxation of community property estates was
still evolving.
B. The Pre-1942 Gift Tax.
Taxation of community property gifts prior to 1942 was even more
indefinite than estate taxation. There were few cases involving the
application of the tax and comparatively few principles can be de-
duced from those cases.
There are three aspects to community property gift taxation: gifts
between the spouses to create "separate" property, gifts to one spouse
from the other's share, and gifts by both of the spouses to a third party.
The gift tax statute prior to 1942 had no special provisions for taxing
community property, and at that time the main difficulty lay in
defining who owned the property so that it could be determined
whether a transfer had been made, and if so, by whom and to whom.
When there were conveyances separating the community estate into
two halves, the courts generally agreed there was no transfer if the
81309 U.S. 107 (1939).82 304 U.S. 264 (1938).
OsEstate of Daniel Arbuthnot, 1942 P-H BTA-TC MEx. DEC. ff 42,394 (1942).
8' Godfrey v. Smith, 180 F 2d 220 (C.A. 9th 1950) ; Waechter v. United States,
98 Fed. Supp. 960 (Wash. 1951), now on appeal. These decisions are not conclusive
since they are based on the 1942 Act but they indicate more than a mere possibility
of complete taxation to the decedent spouse.
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state law defined the community property estate as consisting of two
vested inteersts89 Obviously, there is always a question as to what is
the wife's interest in the particular property being transferred, which
leads to litigation as to whether the husband gave his wife separate
property or community property 88 This distinction between separate
and community property is even more important when determining
the amounts of gifts made by husband and wife to persons outside the
marital community because of the split gift concept. There is not much
historical data available, but the cases and Treasury rulings indicate
that gifts of community property are to be considered as being given
one-half by the husband and one-half by the wife."' In most commu-
nity property states the wife has a right to prevent the husband from
making gifts in fraud of the marital estate. A combination of the fac-
tors of separate property, fraud on the marital rights, and taxation of
revocable gifts can make the field quite complex. 8
C Estate and Gift Taxation from 1942 to 1948.
This was a period of complete taxation of the community property
marital unit because the spouses were not allowed to divide the com-
munity property into two halves for purposes of computing the federal
tax due. Although this system will probably never return, some rele-
vant developments in community property taxation resulted during
the period. First, it became known that states could not establish an
optional community property system for tax splitting purposes.8 Sec-
ond, it was definitely established that Congress had the constitutional
power to tax the community property states without regard to the
state property laws."0 Third, some of the cases involving application of
the Revenue Act of 1942 to community property indicate trends in
the law valuable in prognosticating future federal taxation of commu-
nity property A complete review of these cases is not possible ;n this
limited study, but it should be pointed out that decisions on insur-
88 Rickenberg v. Commissioner, 177 F 2d 114 (C.A. 9th 1949), certiorari denied
338 U.S. 949 (1949) , Estate of Ive J. Perkins, 1 T.C. 982 (1943). But cf. Estate of
R. L. Blaffer v. Commissioner, 103 F 2d 489 (C.A. 5th 1939), certiorars deted 308
U.S. 559 (1939), showing how the state law will be examined.
80 Scofield v. Weiss, 131 F 2d 631 (C.A. 5th 1942), cf. Estate of T. G. Hendrick,
9 TCM 581, CCH Dec. 11, 760 (M) (1950).
37 Edward G. Mills, 12 T.C. 468 (1949), see also Letter of Deputy Commissioner
D. S. Bliss, Nov. 22, 1935 (Not cited in the Cumulative Bulletin or the services, but
cited in the case).
88 Cf. Estate of Mrs. Matney Dyer Lucey, 13 T.C. 1010 (1949).
s9 Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944)
40 Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945), United States v. Rompel, 326 U.S.
367 (1945).
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ance,4 joint interests, 2 control of the estate,'3 effect of the state prop-
erty laws," and division of the estate into separate versus community
property4 can be very helpful in future litigation involving these
subjects. An interesting aspect of these cases is the boomerang effect
they produce. During the period from 1942 to 1948 the taxpayer was
usually attempting to prove that the particular item of property in-
volved in tax litigation was held as separate property in order to avoid
the unfavorable treatment given to community property by the Reve-
nue Act of 1942, while the Commissioner was trying to show that all
the property was held as community property. The arguments used by
both sides may now be returning to haunt their original proponents.
D. Results:
This historical sketch is by no means complete, but it does indicate
the key cases and major historical divisions, and can be used as a ref-
erence in examining the Revenue Act of 1948. Another point indicated
by this history is that commuhity property is not a firm basis on which
to build a permanent tax structure. Furthermore, though the basic
policy of protecting the wife is probably a very good one, the commu-
nity property method of so doing simply does not fit common law con-
cepts. Finally, this history indicates that the difference in tax treat-
ment between the states grew by chance rather than planning, and
once established it was recognized by the taxing authorities to be a
geographical loophole in the tax structure to be dosed by any means
possible. The Revenue Act of 1948 did attempt to do this. It behooves
community property as well as common law advocates to carefully
examine it, since the 1942-1948 Revenue Acts have shown that com-
munity property spouses may be the ones to suffer the unfair tax
burden if the law fails and some hastily-thought out system is sub-
stituted.
It has been pointed out before that it is almost impossible to place
an artificial equalization system upon two basically different property
systems because the initial impact of the tax will be different upon
each system." Even if this could have been accomplished, an attempt
41 Godfrey v. Smith, 180 F 2d 220 (C.A. 9th 1950).
42 Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F 2d 657 (C.A. 9th 1949).
48 Estate of Ralph Rainger, 12 T.C. 483 (1949).
44Estate of A. Bluestein, 15 T.C. 770 (1950).
'5 Commissioner v. Estate of Hinds, 180 F. 2d 930 (C.A. 5th 1950), Estate of
E. S. Hunt, 11 T.C. 984 (1948).
46 Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revente Act of 1948, 61 HAV.
L. RLy. 1097, 1156 (1948), hereinafter referred to as Surrey.
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using community property principles is still questionable because the
silent premise assumed is that federal taxation of community property
is a logical, well-defined system.' The cases indicate that the opposite
is true. The system is indefinite in spots and contains a number of
areas of conflict. To achieve equality by leaving the two fundamental
systems intact imposing two counterbalancing taxes requires not only
an ability to analyze the past history, but also an ability to prophesy
the future. The draftsmen of the 1948 Act recognized these difficulties
and attempted to provide a solution by means of saving clauses,'8 but
as will be pointed out later even these cannot prevent diffierent tax
treatment of the two systems. The draftsmen of the 1948 Act did an
outstanding job. It is their premises that are questioned and not their
draftsmanship.
ANALYsIs OF THE PRESENT STATUTE
This analysis is not an attempt to find fault with every possible
detail of the marital deduction sections of the Revenue Act of 1948.
Its purpose is to point out the sections wherein dangerous technicali-
ties are found, and to indicate why revision is necessary Since 1948
many text and law review authors have devoted a great deal of time
to the marital deduction section of the estate tax law, and various
combinations of their work can be consulted for a detailed analysis of
the entire statute.' This article will analyze briefly the use of each
major section, its technical difficulties, any special inequality between
common law and community property states it produces, and what its
probable social effect will be.
A. Techncal Difficulties and Unplanned Social Effects of the Statute.
1. The passing of property- INT. Rv CODE §§ 812(e) (1) (A),
812(e) (1) (H), 812(e) (4)
These sections set forth what is necessary to pass a quantity of
property for which a marital deduction will be allowed. INT. REv
CODE §§ 812(e) (1) (A) and 812 (e) (4) are the basis for the so-called
47 Since the whole tenor of the act is to make community property concepts avail-
able to common law spouses. See SEN. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
48 See the last paragraph of INT. REv. CODE § 812 (e) (2) (B).
49 Casner, Estate Planning Under the Revenue Act of 1948, 62 HAv. L. Rxv. 413
(1949), Casner, Estate Planning Under the Revenue Act of 1948, 63 H~Av. L. REv.
99 (1949), DeWind, The Approaching Crisis in Federal Estate and Gift Taxation,
38 CALIF. L. REV. 44 (1950), Nossaman, The Impact of Estate and Gift Taxes Upon
the Disposition of Community Property, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 71 (1950), Surrey, note
46 supra, Trachtman, New Marital Deduction Regulations, 88 TRUSTS & EsTATEs
337 (1949).
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"quantitative test," which defines how much property must go to the
spouse in order to qualify for the full 50 per cent of gross estate deduc-
tion allowed by INT. REV. CODE § 812 (e) (1) (H). There are many
technical traps in this area, and a close scrutiny of the regulations and
legislative background is necessary to avoid obvious errors concern-
ing such things as: who is a "spouse," ' what is "value," 1 what is the
effect of an election against the will, 2 what is the effect of a dis-
claimer," and what is "the adjusted gross estate."" In community
property states the technical problems are even greater since there are
concepts of separate and community property. The deduction is allow-
able up to 50 per cent of the separate property of the spouses," but
the problem in computing the deduction immediately becomes one of
what is separate property.'6 As was indicated in section I, supra, there
are numerous areas of confusion as to how community property should
be taxed. The community property executor must consider whether
certain property is disqualified as a joint interest,'7 whether the tes-
tator's insurance will qualify under the new "incidents of ownership"
test,' and whether the particular community property law gives the
wife an expectancy or a vested interest. The effect of the wife's election
against the will in a community property state is not settled since the
regulations do not specifically cover it,"" and the result of a commu-
nity property wife's attempt to will her interest in the cash surrender
value of a community property life insurance policy to someone other
than her husband is incomprehensible. 0 At the present time the only
safe way to handle these technical aspects is to obtain a treasury
ruling or wait for the issue to be decided in court, an expensive and
unsatisfactory way to close an estate.
50 SENr. RE. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), p. 6.
a' INT. REv. CODE § 812(e) (1) (E); U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47c (1942).
52U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47a(f) (1942).
as INT. REv. CODE § 812(e) (4), U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47a(g) (1942).
5"INT. Rxv. CODE § 812(e) (2).
's U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47d(b) (1942).
50U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47c(b) (1942) indicates that either community or
separate property can be given, but cannot be figured into the computation of the gross
estate.
57 Estate of De Lappe v. Commissioner, 113 F 2d 48 (C.A. 5th 1940) ; see also the
cases cited m note 40 supra.
5s Godfrey v. Smith, 180 F 2d 220 (C.A. 9th 1950), Waechter v. United States,
98 F. Supp. 960 (Wash. 1951) now on appeal. It is possible that these cases may lead
to a result of the community property insurance being now deductible under the
marital deduction and non exclusionary under the community property rules.
:'U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47a(f).
e0Estate of De Lappe v. Commissioner, 113 F 2d 48 (C.A. 5th 1950). Bt cf.
Waechter v. United States, 98 F Supp. (Wash. 1950) for a later view.
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This section produces no special inequalities other than its part in
the general tax effect being a greater complication of community prop-
erty technical problems.
The tax effect socially is to force common law testators to give at
least one-half of their net estate to their wives, and at the same time
to prevent these wives from electing against the will or disclaiming
any bequest. In community property states the spouses must follow
the system closely, or risk losing both the community property exclu-
sion and the marital deduction."
2. Non-deductible interests: INT. REV CODE §§ 812(e) (1) (B),
812(e) (1) (C) and 812(e) (1) (E)
These sections are to produce qualitative equality between common
law and community property spouses"2 by limiting the type of interests
allowed to qualify for the marital deduction. Since community prop-
erty is automatically split, it is the common law executor who faces
the most difficulty here. 8 No detailed analysis will be attempted, but
a few tricky technical aspects should be noted. If the Rule in Shelly's
Case has been abolished such a transfer may be non-deductible.6 ' If
the husband's executor purchases an interest for the wife instead of
the wife purchasing it for herself, it will be non-deductible.6 If non-
deductible assets are among those given to the wife, she will not obtain
the full deduction even if there are assets available to pass to her
which would make a valid deduction.6 This factor may even plague
community property spouses."' These things become very elusive and
it may mean that testators will be forced to use a set of stereotyped
formulas to be certain they have not violated the act. 8 Finally, if all
these problems are avoided by the executor, he still must face the
mathematical problem of determining the size of the bequest, since the
61 This occurs through use of the artificial community property sections of the
Code. INT. REv. CODE § 812(e) (2) (C).
02 See Surrey, note 46 .rupra, at p. 1127, for origin of the term qualitative.
63 U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47b (1942), but see Surrey, note 46 supra, at p. 1125
for possible effects on community property and leaseholds.
64 Casner, Estate Planning Under the Revenue Act of 1948-The Regulations, 63
HARy. L. REv. 99, 102 (1949). See note 9.
85 INT. REv. CODE § 812(e) (1) (B) (iii).
60 INT. REv. CODE § 812(e) (1) (C). See Surrey, note 46 supra, at p. 1132.
07 This would occur if the husband has given his wife both separate and community
property in a residuary bequest and it would be completely valid as community prop-
erty, but it violates this section.
68 Powers, Marital Deduction Formulas Where the Interest of the Survizing
Spouse is Effected by Taxes, 27 TAXES 726 (1949).
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interest given is the net after taxes have been subtracted from the
bequest."9
The inequality of this section is apparent from its basic purpose,
which is to require a specific mold for the common law spouse's be-
quests. The common law husband cannot receive the benefits of the
marital deduction if he leaves a life estate to his wife with a remainder
to his children. However, the community property husband may leave
the entire community estate to his wife for life remainder to his chil-
dren by permitting his wife to elect to take a life estate in the entire
property under the will rather than her outright one-half of the com-
munity property. The estate tax would still be on two halves-one-
half on the husband's death under § 811(a) and one-half on the
wife's death under 811(c)."O It thus appears that one of the chief
"equality" features of the new act is nonexistent, since the community
property spouses now have an advantage.
The aforementioned complexities would not be so objectionable if
some beneficial social result was to be obtained, but instead of any
social good being accomplished, some harm may result. The effect of
these provisions is to force common law husbands to avoid necessary
protections for their wives and give them complete interests in order
to obtain tax benefits. Granted, for the sake of argument, that the wife
should have a right to part of the marital community which she helped
create, still the financially wiser husband should be allowed to protect
her against herself.
3. Special exceptions to the "non-deductible" provisions: INT.
REv. CoDE §§ 812(e) (1) (D), 812(e) (1) (F), and 812(e)
(1) (G).
No counsel can do a proper job of advising his client unless he care-
fully scrutinizes these technical pathways that avoid the prohibitions
of the "terminable interest rule,""' Congress' method in the Revenue
Act of 1948 was to give the common law spouses certain privileges,
put restrictions on these privileges, and finally remove some of the
restrictions put on the privileges. This complicated triple step was
necessary since it became apparent that many valid testamentary
69 INT. Rzv. CODE § 812(e) (1) (E), U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47(c) (1942).
70 See Surrey, note '46 supra, at p. 1150 for some elaborations on this basic scheme.
71 INT. REv. CODE § 812(e) (1) (B). This rule prohibits a testator from giving
less than a complete interest to his spouse and attempting to claim a marital deduction
for it.
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bequests would be inadvertently condemned by the broad language of
INT. REv CODE § 812(e) (1) (B)
The common disaster clause is protected, but it must be carefully
drawn. If there is a contingency that can extend the clause beyond the
six months restriction, the deduction will not be allowed. 72 Since the
"property previously taxed" provision is no longer in effect for marital
bequests,"3 it becomes extremely important to have such a provision
to avoid the trap of two taxes on the entire property passing between
spouses dying in a common disaster. Under the present statute a slight
misstep will cause the clause to fail, and the property to be taxed
twice in a brief period of time.
INT. REV CODE § 812(e) (1) (F), on powers of appointment, is
probably one of the most difficult parts to understand due to the pres-
ent confusion in the law on how "settled property" should be taxed. "'
The purpose of this section is to allow the testator to limit the spouse's
interest to a life estate provided he or she is given a complete power to
dispose of the remainder. The first problem to be answered here is
when to create marital deduction trusts as opposed to non-marital
deduction trusts. The non-marital deduction trust is one that will
qualify as a long term non-taxable interest through use of INT. REv
CODE § 811(f) (2) ' Next, the trust, of either type, must be examined
to see whether any of its restrictive clauses will cause the trust to be
taxed to the grantor." In addition to these complexities produced by
the general taxing sections of the estate tax statute, the marital deduc-
tion section adds a problem of how "combined powers" should be
taxed (this occurs when a power of appointment qualifies as a special
power of appointment, so is not taxed when exercised, and yet will
receive the benefits of the marital deduction when given)." There is
also a technical rule on unproductive assets which says that the trustee
must be given a discretionary, not a mandatory, power to retain
72 Willis, Common Disaster Clauses, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 485. The deductions
will fail even if the contingency does not in fact happen.
73INT. Rav. CODE § 811(c) (2) (B).
74 DeWind, The Approaching Crisis in Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 38 CALrF.
L. Rav. 79, 92, particularly note 38. See also President's Tax Message, Jan. 23, 1950,
H. R. Doc. No. 451, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
75 Looker, The Impact of Estate and Gift Taxes on Property Disposition, 38
CALiF. L. Rav. 44, 67 (1950).
70 Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949), Halleck v. Commis-
sioner, 309 U.S. 107 (1949).
77 Trachtman, New Marital Deduction Regulations, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 337, 395
(1949), note 16 in particular; Wheeler and Manheimer, Will Combination of Powers
Defeat the Marital Deduction?, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 476 (1949), Trachtman, A
Rebuttal on Combined Powers of Appointment, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 573 (1949).
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unproductive property in the trust." These brief comments by no
means exhaust the possibilities of difficulties in this field, but do indi-
cate the chief danger points.
This section produces the same inequalities mentioned in section 2,
supra. It may be even more potent, however, if the community prop-
erty wife transfers her one-half to a trust in return for receiving a life
income on a trust including both halves of the community estate. In
this situation the final estate tax on the passage to the children may be
only a tax on the husband's one-half plus a tax on the difference be-
tween the wife's one-half and the value of an estate to the wife for
life." The common law spouse, on the other hand, loses the marital
deduction for attempting such a disposition, and if he transfers to his
wife by inter vivos gift in order to reach the same financial position
as is enjoyed by the community property spouses he must pay a gift
tax on 50 per cent of the transfer.
The result of these sections is to ezicourage long term matriarchal
trusts" or complete freedom of transfer in the widow. It does not seem
as though any thought-out social result is being accomplished by this
"cross-hauling" of tax pressures. Certainly it does not accomplish geo-
graphical tax equality, or produce a great mass of venture capital,
since neither women nor their trustees are very interested in the less-
conservative financial undertakings.
INT. REV. CODE § 812(e) (1) (G) is designed to allow for certain
types of insurance settlement options which might otherwise be con-
demned by INT. REv. CoDE § 812(e) (1) (B). The difficulties of the
community property spouses have already been mentioned.81 The
common law spouses face the tricky technical requirement that the
surviving spouse must receive complete control over the proceeds or
the marital deduction is lost, and this may cause the whole marital
deduction to be lost through the "Unidentified Assets Section" INT.
Rvv. CODE § 812(e) (1) (C). Although the wife may have received
the full benefit of the insurance proceeds, she may lose the marital
deduction because she doesn't have immediate full control." Certain
78 U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47a(c) (5) (1942). This may be unwarranted by the
statute. See Trachtman, supra, at p. 393.
7" See illustration No. 2 at the end of this section. For a more complete explana-
tion, see Surrey, note 46, supra, at p. 1150.
80 It is estimated that 60 per cent of the wealth of the United States is owned or
controlled by women. What's Happening to U.S. Wealth and Women?, New York
Times, April 11, 1948, Magazine Section.
81 See notes 58 and 60 supra.
82 U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47a(d) (1942).
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insurance company formalities (such as proof of death) may make the
wife's interest contingent and thus non-deductible. The best solution
seems to be for the spouse to leave a series of separate policies with
varying settlement options so that some policies will qualify for the
marital deduction, and others can pass directly to the children. This
will remove the possibility of double taxation of those policies which
the testator wants to pass to his children. This section produces the
same inequalities that are produced in the trust field. The social results
may be even worse since protective clauses for the children cannot be
placed in a policy without losing the marital deduction. The section
also encourages giving the wife a lump sum free of protections at the
husband's death since too many restrictions in the terms of the settle-
ment option will destroy the marital deduction desired.
4. Items not includible in the adjusted gross estate: INT. REv
CODE §§ 812(e) (2) (A), 812(e) (2) (B), 812(e) (2) (C)
INT. REv CODE § 812(e) (2) (A) is the section which defines the
"adjusted gross estate." The main problem in using it is in deterrmn-
ing whether the wife has received a bequest or the repayment of
a debt. "
INT. Rxv CODE § 812(e) (2) (B) is the section designed to prevent
community property spouses from taking advantage of the marital
deduction.8' There are special subdivisions covering community prop-
erty testamentary bequests, 5 inter vivos transfers,"' insurance, s and
the ratio to be applied when "mixed" property is devised."' The previ-
ous discussion on insurance and joint interests has indicated that there
may be areas where the property cannot be split as community prop-
erty, yet will not be saved by the last paragraph of INT. REv CODE
§ 812(e) (2) (B) This may act as an inadvertent penalty on spouses
who happen to reside in community property states.
The most dangerous part of the statute for community property
spouses, however, is INT. REv CODE § 812(e) (2) (C) This section
was placed in the statute to prevent easy avoidance of the community
property restrictions. Without such a provision the community prop-
erty spouses could convert the community property into separate
83 U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47c(b) (1942).
84 These provisions may also affect common law spouses in those cases where the
conflict of law rule refers them to the community property state law. See Black v.
Commissioner, 114 F 2d 355 (C.A. 9th 1940).
8 5 INT. REV. CODE § 812 (e) (2) (B) (i). See notes 7, 8, and 9 supra.
86 INT. REV. CODE § 812(e) (2) (B) (ii).
87 INT. REV. CODE § 812(e) (2) (B) (iii). See notes 58 and 60 supra.
88 INT. REV. CODE § 812(e) (2) (B) (iv)
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property, come within the marital deduction section, and obtain a
second splitting of each half. The section was an obvious necessity for
geographic equality, but it provides some serious technical difficulties
by utilizing an "artificial community property" concept." The statute
and regulations are silent as to the result when the marital community
sells property which later is acquired by the husband or wife as sepa-
rate property, or what will be the effect of termination of the commu-
nity by divorce with a subsequent remarriage."0 This difficulty becomes
more pronounced when the state law itself is confused as to status of
the property owned by the marital community and whether certain
interests have been given to the wife.
This section produces no special inequalities beyond those men-
tioned in the previous sections. It promotes the policy of community
property spouses remaining within the confines of the community
property system which is probably a good result since this system does
provide a certain amount of protection for the widow
5. Revisions made necessary in other sections of. te code: INT.
REv. CODE §§ 812(c) (2) (B), 113(a) (5) (omitting gifts).
The difficulties caused by the removal of the five-year relief provi-
sions through passage of INT. REv. CODE § 812(c) have been men-
tioned in the previous discussion about legal estates, long term trusts
and common disaster clauses. This section was changed by the Reve-
nue Act of 1948 so that none of the property given to a spouse is pro-
tected against double taxation. This arbitrary decision was necessary
to prevent double exemption of marital gifts. The equitable solution
would have been to exclude from the protection only such items as
received the benefits of the marital deduction, but such a solution
would have necessitated complex tracing provisions as to whether a
particular item was given as part of the marital deduction or other-
wise. The result is that a testator must be extremely careful to avoid
giving an aging wife any property in addition to that qualifying for
the marital deduction unless it is in some form of a long term trust
which will not be taxable in her estate."' The geographical inequalities
produced by this section are obvious because the problem of property
previously taxed does not even exist as to the wife's one-half of the
so U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.47d(b) (1942).90 Kent, Property Settlement Agreements in Community Property States, 1949 Tax
Institute of University of Southern California (1949).91 Looker, The Impact of Estate and Gift Taxes on Property Disposition, 38 CALW.
L. REv. 44, 64 (1950).
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community estate. The community property husband faces no danger
of incorrectly computing the amount going to his wife since he knows
before death exactly how much his wife will receive tax free; further-
more, he can distribute his property to her through life estates with
non-taxable powers of appointment in order that there will never be
more than two taxes each on one half.
Because of this section husbands hesitate to leave their wives more
than exactly one-half of their "adjusted gross estate." This section,
therefore, works at cross purposes with the whole basic policy of pro-
tecting the wife, exemplified by allowing a 50 per cent deduction on
gifts to her. This provision may be necessary to protect the tax, but
it forces testators to either tie up their property in long term trusts or
not to give it to their wives at all. Neither of these alternatives pro-
duces a very desirable social and economic result.
INT. REV CODE § 113(a) (5) is the section which correlates the
estate tax with the capital gains tax by establishing a new basis for
future taxation. The change causes the basis of all the community
property assets to rise or fall according to their value at the first
spouse's death. This may be a great advantage in times of rising
prices, since a surviving spouse would find the basis of his half of the
community estate raised from cost to present value, which could pro-
duce a great tax saving. During a period of falling prices, the inverse
would be true, yet this is apparently constitutional. 2 At the present
time, this will probably cause testators to make testamentary devises
instead of inter vivos gifts, since a great saving in income tax can be
effected by having the basis rise above the cost to the donor.3
B Inter Vivos Transfers: INT. REv CODE §§ 813, 1000(f),
1004(a) (3)
The gift tax has always been somewhat unwanted but necessary It
performs a necessary function of protecting the income and estate tax
laws, but it has been little developed or understood. The discussion
here will be brief, since it is closely connected with the estate tax,
and the comments already made about that tax also apply to it. How-
ever this tax is very important, and more discussion will be devoted
to it in the section containing suggestions for revision.
Generally speaking, there are three parts to the gift tax marital
9:2 See Surrey, note 46, supra, at p. 1140.
s Perhaps this is the reason for having lower gift tax rates. See Casner, Estate
Planning Under the Revenue Act of 1948, 62 HARV. L. REv. 413 (1949).
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deduction: INT. REv. CODE § 1004(a) (3) relating to the transfers to
the wife, INT. REV. CODE § 1000(f) relating to transfers to third par-
ties by the marital unit, and INT. REv. CODE § 813 which attempts to
prevent double taxation.
1. Internal Revenue Code § 1004(a) (3).
The chief purpose of this section is to allow common law husbands
to transfer one-half of their earnings to their wives at a reduced gift
tax rate in order that they may be placed in the same position as their
community property counterparts. A complete discussion of its action
is beyond the scope of this paper, but a brief chart should indicate its
basic operation.
Estate Tax
812(e) (1) (A)
812(e) (1) (B)
812(e) (1) (C)
812(e) (1) (D)
Exhibit 195
Gift Tax
1004(a) (3) (A)
1004(a) (3) (B) (i
1004(a) (3) (B) (ii
1004(a) (3) (D)
1004(a) (3) (C)
1004(a) (3) (E)
(ii) 1004(a)
(iii) I
(3) (F) (i)
812(e) (2) (B) (iv) 1004(a) (3) (F). (iv)
812(e) (2) (B)
812(e) (2) (C)
1004(a) (3) (F) (H)
1004(a) (3) (F) (iii)
Purpose
To give the wife one-half of
husband's earnings with
a 50 per cent deduction.
Prevent avoidance "termi-
nable interest rule."
Prevent avoidance "uniden-
tified assets rule."
Do not need protection
against inter vivos gifts.
Do not need protection
against inter vivos gifts.
To allow inter vivos as well
as testamentary trusts for
the wife.
Insurance.
General defining clause.
To prevent community prop-
erty spouses from enjoy-
ing the benefits of the
marital deduction.
Ratio of community prop-
erty to separate property.
Saving clause for commu-
nity property dispositions.
Artificial community prop-
erty designation for both
types of disposition.
9' See Casner, Estate Planning Under the Revenue Act of 1948, 62 HA1~v. L. REV.
421 (1949) for a complete discussion.
05 All References in this chart are to the Internal Revenue Code sections.
(1) (E)
(1) (F)
812(e)
812(e)
812(e)
812(e)
812(e)
812(e)
812(e)
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2. Internal Revenue Code §1000(f).
This section was designed to give common law spouses the commu-
nity property ability to make split gifts to third parties. This section,
however, has no prohibition preventing community property spouses
from splitting their gifts, so it is posible to split the community prop-
erty into two halves and give one-half away by split gifts, thus reduc-
ing the taxes on passing one-half the estate under the present pro-
gressive tax rate with the two thirty-thousand-dollar exemptions. Since
many community property states provide for a division into separate
property, this section may allow community property spouses to ac-
complish by inter vivos gift what is prohibited by testamentary gift,"'
and then perhaps pass the remainder of the estate at death as com-
munity property under the artificial community property provisions.
The tax effects of this are unknown, and it is not recommended as
"safe" estate planning.
3. Internal Revenue Code § 813.
This section prevents double taxation of gifts which are subject to
an estate tax. It protects the marital deduction gifts only to the extent
to which a tax is paid by establishing a ratio of tax to gifts.
There is ordinarily an advantage, once having paid a gift tax, to then
have the gift declared to be in contemplation of death. The marital
deduction system, however, may cancel part of this."
4. Social effects of the gift tax sections.
Except for the attempt to produce a rough equality between the two
property systems, there does not seem to have been any preconceived
social policy behind the enactment of these sections.
It has been suggested that such things as incentive to business,
spreading of income tax incidence, and the change in basis are the
reasons for having inter vivos gifts treated differently than testamen-
tary gifts. Congressional history does not indicate this was in the mind
of Congress when it passed the original sections,9 and a check of
Treasury statistics reveals that testators are apparently not taking
96 INT. Rav. CODE §§ 812(e) (2) (B) & (C) are the prohibitions on such testa-
mentary gifts.
97 See Surrey, note 46 supra, at p. 1145; also see Looker, note 91 supra, at pp. 46
and 47.
98 See H. R. REP. No. 708, 72nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1932) ; SEzN. REP. No. 665, 72nd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
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advantage of the benefit anyway.9 The writer has come to the conclu-
sion, therefore, that there is no vital reason for treating inter vivos
gifts differently than testamentary gifts.
C. The Statute as a Working Whole.
The effect of the 1948 gift and estate tax changes has been to give
rough equality, but the following illustrations will indicate some of the
unusual and unexpected results that can be obtained. The examples
indicate that in many cases equality has not been achieved, and that
inter vivos transfers are no longer favored as much as they were. These
illustrations are not exhaustive and are not meant to label the whole
act as useless; instead they are used to point up a few of the hypo-
thetically bad situations. The exemptions and exclusions will be con-
sidered as having already been exhausted. "H" and "W" will be used
as symbols for husband and wife respectively.
Exhibit 2
Common Law
H has a $1,000,000 estate
H->W for life->remainder to chil-
dren
Estate Tax on $1,000,000 paid
or
H--_W $500,000 inter vivos
Then follows the community prop-
erty model
Extra charge: gift tax on $250,000
or
H->$500,000 to W for life->remain-
der to wife
17-4500,000 to W for life->remain-
der to children
Two taxes on $500,000 plus the risk
that W won't give the property to
the children.
Community Property'0 0
H & W have a $1,000,000 estate
H---> 2W for life, remainder to chil-
dren
A binding agreement for W to leave
her :V2 to the children
One tax on $500,000 at H death
One tax on $500,000 at W death
or possibly
One tax on $500,000 at H death
One tax on $500,000 minus value of
wife's life interest on $1,000,000.
Instead of simply correcting the common law advantage of giving a
life estate, this new system gives an advantage to the community prop-'
erty spouses, and at the expense of deterring a legitimate protective
trust for the wife and children in common law states.
99 Hearings Before Committee on Ways and Means, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., Exhibit
5, Note 13 (1950).100 See Surrey, note 46 supra, at p. 1150; but see Scofield v. Bethea, 170 F. 2d 934
(C.A. 5th 1948).
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Exhibit 3
Estate Tax Equality by Splitting the Estate-INT. REv. CODE
§ 1004(a) (3)
Common Law Community Property
H has $1,000,000 estate H & W have a $1,000,000 estate
H gives $500,000 to W H & W convert to separate property
therefore therefore
H W H W
$500,000 $500,000 $500,000 $500,000
Gift Tax paid on $250,000. No Gift Tax since no transfer.10'
The law is closer to achieving equality than before when the whole
$500,000 would be taxed, but complete equality could not be achieved
unless all interspousal transfers were exempted.
Exhibit 4
The Splitting of Gifts to a Third Party:
Common Law
H has a $1,000,000 estate
H gives W $500,000
H W
$500,000 $500,000
H gives $250,000 to the children
W gives $250,000 to the children
Taxes:
H to W-gift tax on $250,000
Two taxes on $125,000 for the gifts
to the children
Two estate taxes on $250,000 at the
death of H & W.
Community Property
H & W have a $1,000,000 estate
H & W convert to separate prop-
erty
H W
$500,000 $500,000
H gives $250,000 to the children
W gives $250,000 to the children
Taxes:
H to W-0 gift tax
Two taxes on $125,000 each for the
gifts to the children
Two estate taxes on $250,000 at the
death of H & W
Tax saving of the gift tax on
$250,000.
Exhibit 5
Comparative Advantages on Testamentary Gifts:
a. Gift to Wife at the Death of the Husband
Common Law
H has a $1,000,000 estate
H gives $500,000 to W during life1 2
H W
$500,000 $500,000
H gives his $500,000 to W at death
Taxes:
Gift tax on $250,000
Estate tax on $250,000.
Community Property
H & W have a $1,000,000 estate
H W
$500,000 $500,000
H gives his $500,000 to W at death
Taxes:
Estate tax on $500,000.
101 Estate of Edward M. Mills v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 468 (1949).
102 It is obviously cheaper to give one gift during the life of H.
!Nf.-,y
COMMUNITY ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
b. Gift to a Third Person instead of the Wife
Common Law Community Property
H has a $1,000,000 estate H & W have a $1,000,000 estate
H gives W $500,000 inter vivos H W
H W $500,000 $500,000
$500,000 $500,000 gives to gives to
gives to gives to X X
X X Taxes:
Taxes: Two estate taxes on $500,000.
Gift tax on $250,000
Two estate taxes on $500,000.
Notice that the advantage is to the common law spouse in part "a,"
and to the community property spouse in part "b." Is there some rea-
son for granting'these peculiar advantages?
Exhibit 6
The Marital Deduction as a Deterrent to Inter Vivos Gifts
Alternative A Using the Gift Tax
H has a $1,000,000 estate
H gives $250,000 to charity (inter
vivos gift)
H gives $500,000 to W at death
H gives $250,000 to children at
death
Taxes:
Estate Tax on $250,000 to children
125,000 to W
Total $375,000
Alternative B Using the Estate Tax
$1,000,000
H gives $250,000 to charity at death
H gives $500,000 to W at death
H gives $250,000 to children at
death
Taxes:
Estate Tax on $250,000 to children
0 to W
Total $250,000
This is true because as the gross estate becomes smaller less will
qualify for the marital deduction. Is there some planning behind this,
or does it just happen because of the system?
D. Evaluation of the Present Sections of the Code:
The previous discussion and examples it is felt point up the bad
spots in the present law. There are many situations wherein the desired
"equality" is achieved, and the method is much fairer than the pre-
1942 system. The legislative craftsmen did an excellent job, consider-
ing the task they were expected to perform. However, it is submitted
that the problem was insoluble due to the basic premises assumed.
No one could be expected to impose a perfect artificial equality on two
basically different property systems, each involving many complex
methods of disposition. The premise of the plan, not its execution, was
at fault.
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GENERAL PROPOSAL FOR REVISION
To criticize without offering an alternative which can in its turn be
criticized is a destructive approach which will not help solve the diffi-
culties faced in the present statute. The writer, therefore, has briefly
outlined in this section of the article the basic requirements of a sug-
gested revision which he believes can be incorporated into the present
Internal Revenue Code without greatly upsetting the present theories
of taxation. The most severe obstacle which any statutory revision
must overcome is resistance to Congressional enactment. Many fine
plans.. are now resting in Congressional pigeon-holes because they
are considered too complex or too sweeping, so that to adopt them
would mean the tax law would lose many of its valuable precedents.
The writer realizes that a piecemeal attack on the Internal Revenue
Code is theoretically not the best method of revision, but the problem
presented is one of persuading Congress to enact this tax reform as
well as developing the technical improvements. A transitional phase
is needed wherein theories of tax integration and marital unit taxation
can be tested without upsetting the present Revenue Code, because
this is the only way to move forward from our present complacency.
The marital deduction section is just such a transitional touchstone.
This section is an ideal testing ground because it has not become firmly
fixed in the tax law by judicial interpretation; it is almost completely
separated from the rest of the statute by its unusual 50 per cent
exemptions and deductions; yet it provides a large enough field in
which to test new theories. Suggesting any changes that would greatly
alter the existing tax structure other than in the marital deduction
sections has been deliberately avoided, but these sections would be
completely revamped, through use of the new concepts involving a
marital unit and a transfer tax. There are also some brief suggestions
as to how these revisions could be correlated with the present Revenue
Code. It is hoped this proposed revision does not create a new "tax
monster" to replace the one we already have. This proposed revision
is not a simple panacea because a complex society cannot be expected
to have a simple tax structure unless it operates by administrative fiat.
Even a complex society, however, should be capable of having a tax
103 Federal Estate and Gift Taxes-A Proposal for Integration and Correlation
with the Income Tax, Advisory Committee to the Treas. Dept., U.S. Printing Office
1947-hereinafter referred to as the Triasury proposal; DeWind, The Approaching
Crisis in Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 79 (1950), hereinafter
referred to as DeWind.
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structure that follows certain principles of reason and fairness with
enough simplicity that the "tax experts" and occasionally even the
average citizen can understand it. If not then perhaps our whole soci-
ety is becoming too complex for efficient administration.
This proposed solution requires three essentials: first, the creation
of a marital unit with appropriate rules for its dissolution; second, the
creation of a single transfer tax to replace the present dual system of
estate and gift taxation; and third, a correlation of the new system
with the unchanged sections of the Internal Revenue Code.
For convenience the surviving spouse is generally referred to in the,
feminine gender, but the same principles would apply if the husband
were the surviving spouse. The specific sections to be removed or the
new sections to be inserted have not been set forth because such tech-
nical draftsmanship is not appropriate until the basic ideas have been
agreed upon. In general, however, the marital unit tax suggested would
be put into the Internal Revenue Code in place of the present marital
deduction section, INT. REV. CODE § 812(e). Present INT. REV. CODE
§§ 811(c), 812(e) and 1004(a) (3) would be repealed; §§ 113(a) (5)
-dealing with basis of marital property, 813 and 936 dealing with
combining estate and gift taxation of the marital community, and
1000(f) on "split gifts" would be modified so as not to apply to the
marital community. The effect of all these changes would be to cause
all estate taxation of the marital community to be concentrated in one
section of the Code.
The suggestions will be presented under four general headings: The
marital unit-the transfer tax---correlation with the income tax-
transition from the present law.
A. The Marital Unit.
The first suggestion is that a marital unit be created which will
consist of husband and wife. This is a logical step from the present
method of taxing married individuals."' The estates of married indi-
viduals are now taxed differently from single individuals through use
of the marital deduction system and to treat married couples as a tax
unit will not greatly alter the present tax structure or disrupt any
great body of legal knowledge. The present income tax statute treats
the marital community as a unit for tax benefits and this change would
only make the estate and gift taxes conform with the income tax.
This marital unit consisting of husband and wife would not include
104 INT. REv. CODE § 812(e) (1).
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the children of the family, since they represent a new tax generation.
Before marriage each individual would be subject to the present estate
and gift tax laws. Upon marriage each partner would bring his or her
assets into the marital community, and these assets would form the
assets of the marital unit. At this time a concept entitled "the existing
marital community" would be created, and transfers of the marital
assets would be taxed through use of the "marital unit." This unit
would not be considered any sort of artificial person, but simply a
method of federal tax designation, as is done with the community
property "community"'05 for many purposes of federal taxation. The
"existing marital community" would last until legal separation of the
spouses, death of one spouse with the subsequent remarriage of the
surviving spouse, or the death of both spouses. These cut-off points
are calculated to impose the transfer tax for as long a period as is
consonant with the marital status of the parties. The tax will be cumu-
lative from marriage, so it would be desirable to apply it from mar-
riage to death, but in this day of quick and easy divorce some simple
and efficient method of dissolving the unit and returning the two
spouses to the status of independent individuals must be provided.
Recognizing the serious effect that taxes have upon the actions of the
well-to-do individuals any solution as to the tax effect of termination
of the "existing marital community" must be examined to see what
social consequences the proposal will produce."' The result produced
will depend on two things: when the marital unit will be terminated,
and what tax machinery will go into operation on such a termination.
The tax machinery will be discussed in part B of this section; the
reasons for the proposed termination at the time of legal separation
are indicated below.
The termination times of legal separation, death of one party and
subsequent remarriage of the other, or death of both parties are calcu-
lated to give as full effect to the transfer tax as is possible without
substantially altering the present law. By such cut-off points the
normal spouse will start paying a transfer tax when married and will
continue making incremental tax payments upon each transfer until
death regardless of whether her marital partner predeceases her.
There will be no tax paid on transfers to her by the decedent husband,
105 See RCW 26.16.030, 26.16.040 [RRS §§ 6892, 6893].
106 1 hope to provide "tax neutrality" if possible, but if not, then to produce a bene-
ficial social result such as encouraging marriage. The views expressed in this paper
are not meant to indicate that Americans no longer marry for love, but simply that a
tax price or benefit will be an influencing factor which must be recognized.
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and transfers he makes to persons outside the marital unit at death
will be taxed by the means of the transfer tax system. In case of a
subsequent remarriage by a surviving spouse, she will carry into the
new marriage the tax base of the old marriage."°" Since the transfer
tax will once again be applied to the new marital unit, it is fitting that
the old unit should be merged into the new one. This carries out the
previous policy of applying the transfer tax from marriage until death.
Legal separation and divorce present a more difficult problem, as
they involve a complete termination of the marital community which
finds both parties eager to resume completely independent existences.
The great danger of tax effects in this area is that divorce may be
encouraged by unwise tax policies. Recognizing this danger, the writer
still feels the marital community must be terminated and the spouses
returned to separate status with as little tax effect as possible since
they are no longer a marital unit acting as one. The legal separation
cut-off point has the advantage of being certain, and it also will prevent
schemes of partial separation to obtain the benefits of both the trans-
fer tax and the estate tax.
The social results of such a section will be to promote protection of
the widow and any minor children dependent upon her and to tax
the passage of wealth once, and only once, a generation. Geographical
tax equality between the community property and common law states
will be achieved in the same manner as is accomplished under the
present income tax provisions. The creation of this marital unit only
recognizes the historical, economic, and social fact that the husband
and wife are a unit. The proposed marital unit may be criticized as
providing an incentive to marry and as binding the two spouses too
closely together. Socially, this could not be termed undesirable.
B. The Transfer Tax and Its Effect on the Marital Unit.
1. The structure of the tax:
The basic structure of the tax will be much the same as that recom-
mended in the 1947 Treasury Proposal"'8 and very similar to that used
in the present gift tax.10 This involves oxne transfer tax at graduated
rates based on the total amount of transfers made during life and at
death. Each year's tax would be determined by establishing the total
107 This presents some problems of social results achieved since remarriage can be
encouraged or deterred by the tax rate that a widow will carry into the new marriage.
See part B of this section for a more complete explafiation, and a suggested solution.
108 See the Treasury proposal, note 103 ,supra, pp. 14 and 15.
109 IxT. Rxv. CoDE § 1001; U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, §§ 86.6 and 86.7 (1943).
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amount of taxable transfers up to the year in question and adding to
that the amount of net taxable transfers from the marital unit during
that year to determine the total taxable transfers made. Then a tax
at a graduated rate would be imposed upon the two figures obtained
and the difference between the two would be the tax for the year in
question."' This tax would be uniform on the net taxable amount of
all transfers whether during life or at death so as to avoid any differ-
ence in the tax rate due to some taxes being computed on "net" gifts
while others are computed on "gross" estates."- The Treasury pro-
posal on exemptions and exclusions to give the sum of the present
estate and gift tax exemptions with part of the exemption being
reserved until the termination of the marital community seems to be
very good." 2 The unexhausted inter vivos exemption could be carried
over to also apply to the final transfer tax, since the exemption should
follow the cumulative rate schedule. The exclusion should definitely
be put on a per donor basis to prevent avoidance of the transfer tax
by a donor making a large number of $3,000 gifts. If some exclusion
on a per donee basis is necessary to obviate administrative difficulties
due to Christmas and wedding gifts," 3 it should be lowered to a nomi-
nal figure of $50 to $100 which is more in line with the amount actu-
ally expended for such objects.
The rates to be used for this tax depend upon the revenue to be
raised. Since this revision is to be correlated with the present statute,
it is suggsted that the present gift tax rates be used. The writer realizes
this will reduce the death tax rate by three-fourths, but the fact that
all transfers are cumulated from marriage will probably more than
offset this reduction.
The proposed system will require a more careful check of gifts than
is made at present. This can be solved by adding a section to the in-
come tax form requiring a listing of transfers made. All transfers
above the $50 to $100 exclusion would have to be listed, and this
would be added to the previous transfers made to determine the yearly
tax. It is submitted that a transfer tax system should eventually be
11o See the Treasury proposal, note 103 supra, p. 14, for a more complete expla-
nation.
111 The Treasury proposal, ibid., seems to maintain this distinction, but this seems
to create needless confusion. How valid a policy reason is there for increasing the tax
rate by a complicated "tax on the tax"?
112 See the Treasury proposal, ibid., at p. 16.
113 See SEN. REP. No. 665, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1932) ; H. R. REP. No. 708,
72nd Cong., Ist Sess. 29 (1932). These indicate that such presents were the reason for
the per donee exclusion.
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substituted for the entire estate and gift tax system, but this seems
to be too sweeping a change to obtain immediate congressional action.
2. Application of the tax to the marital unit.
The transfer tax liability will start with the marriage which estab-
lishes the "existing marital community." Each spouse will bring into
the marriage his or her present gift tax cumulations and exemptions.
These will be merged and will create the "point on the cumulative rate
schedule" for the marital unit. This point will be at the higher point
of the two separate spouses so as to neither encourage nor discourage
marriage."1, The unused gift tax exemptions would be allowed in toto,
but only one $60,000 estate tax exemption would be given to the
marital unit. Each year the net "gifts" made by the marital unit to
someone outside the unit would be taxed."' Transfers between lus-
band and wife are within the unit and would not be taxed as transfers,
and those transfers from the decedent spouse to the surviving spouse
also would not be taxed since the "existing marital community" con-
tinues until the death or subsequent remarriage of the surviving
spouse. This is not a very radical change, since there is no income tax
benefit in transferring between the spouses and the exemption from
taxation of that property passing to the surviving spouse is simply an
extension of the present 50 per cent deduction. As a result, the social
policy of protecting the widow is accomplished without a complicated
50 per cent gift of specially defined "exempt" property. At the death
of both spouses the final transfer tax is paid on the total amount of
assets remaining to be passed. There are some complex variations that
can be worked out by varying the type of interest given, but it is felt
the basic plan is clear. Obviously, this system shifts the burden of
transfer taxation to the next generation by encouraging tax free trans-
fers to the wife which leaves the bulk of the estate intact to be taxed
later at a higher rate on the progressive scale. This policy seems to be
in keeping with the present American tax policy favoring protection of
the widow, and at the same time, discouraging the accumulation of,
family fortunes.
The more difficult problems arise in determining how to tax the
114 There can be a number of acceptable compromises other than the one suggested
such as adding the two together and dividing by two or just taking the sum of the two.
The suggested solution seems to provide the greatest "neutrality" of tax operation.
115 This is another reason for having a lower transfer tax rate, since the pro--
gressive rate will rise more steeply than at present where the two spouses each keep
a separate cumulative schedule and each gift made is split into two halves. See Ix.
Rnv. CODE § 1000 f; U.S. Treas. Reg. 108, §§ 86.6 and 86.7 (1943).
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effects of termination of the "existing marital community" by remar-
riage of a surviving spouse or by legal separation. Looking first at the
problem of remarriage, a compromise is necessary. We do not wish to
discourage the remarriage of likely widows because they have a high
point on the "cumulative rate schedule," yet we do not wish to encour-
age prospective tax-dodgers marrying elderly individuals with a low
tax basis in order to obtain the benefits of a transfer taxation cumu-
lative total. On balancing the interests, it seems that the surviving
spouse should take three-fourths of cumulative rate base"' and any
unexhausted exemptions, including the $60,000 death exemption, into
a second marriage. This may deter some remarriages but to obtain
fairness would require a complicated series of tracing provisions to
determine who actually made the previous gifts." 7 This new point
would be combined with the new spouse's "point on the cumulative
rate schedule" in the same manner as is done in any new marriage, and
the new marital unit would be covered by the transfer tax.
Divorce and legal separation must be more rigidly controlled than
the above situation, since they can be planned by the parties and since
the surviving parties do not desire to maintain any further connection,
financial or otherwise, with each other. The date of legal separation is
the cut-off point, and at that time the two spouses will become inde-
pendent individuals subject to the estate and gift tax laws. The estate
tax provides no problem since, by hypothesis, both parties are still
alive. The gift tax is a problem, as some means must be found to
translate the unit transfer tax cumulations into an individual gift tax
cumulation without creating a tax benefit which would encourage such
a transition via divorce. Again, tracing would be very complex, so
some sort of compromise is necessary. The best solution seems to be
to require each spouse to take three-quarters of the marital unit's
"point on the cumulative rate schedule" as his point on the gift tax
schedule."" To allow each to take one-half of the previous base would
encourage divorce, but to require each to assume the full amount of
the previous gifts would unfairly burden individuals, legitimately en-
118 See note 112, supra. This problem is partially alleviated by forcing the spouse
to use the higher basis of the two spouses.
17 There are many other possible compromises on this point such as dividing the
"point" in half because of one surviving individual, or forcing the widow to take the
whole tax burden. The answer to this problem will lie in the political tenor of the
Congress passing the act.
118 This would discourage divorces-at the same time the treasury revenues will be
maintained because two people each with a three-quarters basis should just about
match the unit with the progressive tax on the whole amount.
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titled to (or forced into) a divorce, who have consented to many gifts
to his or her ex-spouse's relatives. Assuming the above solution is
accepted, the two ex-spouses would again become subject to individual
estate and gift taxation and would remain so until their death or sub-
sequent remarriage. In case of remarriage the ex-spouse would carry
into it his or her gift tax liability as in any initial marriage.
C. Definition of a Transfer and Correlation with the Income Tax:
To define when a transfer has taken place is necessary, and the
simple solution would be to establish a fixed definitiofi and correlate
the other sections of the Code to this definition. This would involve
lengthy and radical changes in the whole code, however, which would
destroy the whole purpose of this suggested revision. The best solution
seems to be to define a transfer as being "any transfer ... except no
transfer shall be considered as having taken place in any case where
the income tax incidence produced by the Internal Revenue Code at
the time of transfer has not shifted from transferor to transferee." The
gift tax serves as a protection for the income and estate taxes. There
is no longer any need to protect the estate tax because the transfer tax
covers that. The income tax should only be protected in those in-
stances where the grantor is no longer required to pay income tax on
the property being transferred. This protection is provided by defining
the transfer tax in terms of the income tax; then there is no danger of
double taxation as exists at present. This definition would not disturb
the existing income tax concepts of transfer, and these judicially
worked out concepts will form a basis for determining whether a trans-
fer has been made. This has the disadvantage of tying the transfer tax
to a series of complicated and confused income tax principles" 9 which
need correcting. The job of correcting these, however, will be a long
hard-fought process which may take years, 1 and by tying the transfer
tax to the income tax the two will be automatically corrected at the
same time.
In correlating the transfer tax with the income tax some note must
be taken as to the effect of the new system upon INT. Rnv. CODE §
113 (a) (5) basis. This section should be changed so that any change
in basis due to death occurs only at the termination of the marital unit
119 Cf. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) ; Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331 (1940); Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F. 2d 142 (C.A. 1st 1947).
120 See DeWind, note 103, supra, p. 93, for an indication of what needs to be done,
and some proposed solutions.
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by the death of both spouses. In other cases the original basis should
be maintained.
The change outlined above will not involve as great a change as
might be imagined. This can be revealed by a brief examination how
the transfer tax would compare with the present gift tax as to the
major types of taxable transfers."'
1. Transfer complete for both income and gift taxation.
The present method of taxing this type of transfers would not be
greatly changed since the transfer tax incidence would be the same as
the present gift tax incidence. A tax would be paid at the time of trans-
fer on all gifts going outside the marital unit and no further tax would
be paid. This type of transfer includes such things as transfers in trust
wherein the grantor retains no forbidden controls over the income and
complete transfers of income producing property.
2. Transfers incomplete for both income and gift taxes under the
present statute.
There would be no tax on the original transfer since the grantor is
still paying income tax on the property. There would be a tax on any
incremental payments going to a party outside the marital unit, and a
tax to the grantor when the incidence of income taxation finally shifts
to the grantee. An example of this type is a transfer by the grantor to
a third party, but with a power to "alter, amend, or revoke" retained
by the grantor.'22
3. Transfer complete for the income tax but incomplete for the gift
tax.
As to this type of transfer the transfer tax will change the present
gift tax incidence and with beneficial results. Under the transfer tax
system a tax would be paid at the time of making the transfer on the
value of the interest being transferred. This would be the final tax paid
by the transferor and the transferee would have all future tax liability
as to that property. Examples of this type are transfers in trust to
someone "adverse" to the grantor (such as the right to accumulate
income for the beneficiary, or a joint power in the grantor with some
third party to control the trust),"'2 and one of the most confused areas
of the tax law wherein the grantor transfers to X for life, remainder
121 For a more complete discussion, see the Treasury proposal, note 103 supra,
appendices B & C, pp. 174 and 175; also see DeWind, note 103 supra, at p. 93.
122 INT. REv. CODE §§ 166, 811(d), and 1000.
128 Estate tax: Helvering v. City Bank Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935); gift tax: Com-
missioner v. Prouty, 115 F. 2d 331 (C.A. 1st 1940).
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to Y with a remote reversionary interest if all the named remainder-
men fail to survive him.2
4. Transfers incomplete for the income tax but complete for the
estate and gift taxes.
In this area the proposed transfer tax can remedy a great evil of the
present tax system which often results in an unfair hardship to the
taxpayer. Under the present system the grantor can be required to
pay gift tax and later estate tax on property which is declared to still
be his for income tax purposes. The proposed definition of a transfer
would cause the present "gift tax" to be removed and no tax would be
collected from a transferor until the incidence of income taxation had
shifted from him to his transferee. Since a tax will be imposed some
time after the physical transfer has been made the suggested tax revi-
sion will need some method of tracing and collecting the tax at the
later time. There will be no difficulty if the marital unit remains
unbroken since the tax applies to the unit and will be collected when
the incidence of income taxation finally shifts due to the death of the
transferor or some other stipulated event occurring. If there is a termi-
nation of the marital unit the problem is more difficult, but the logical
approach would be to declare the transfer tax due at the time of legal
separation or divorce. The amount of the tax will be predicated on
the value of the property at the time of separation. By imposing such
a tax at that time the transfer tax will be correlated with the gift tax
basis of the spouse bearing the income tax burden. This may seem to
be a new complication, but in reality it exists under the present statute
in those cases where the husband and wife agree to make a split gift of
community property just before a divorce occurs. There does not seem
to be any authority as to whom the tax liability will follow, but the
logical answer would be to have the tax liability follow the one who
retains the "forbidden" controls, since the income tax liability in these
cases is based on "control" and not on "ownership."
This is a difficult area to correlate, because the income tax itself is
very confused, but there are established points of tax incidence being
shifted which will provide a definite basis for the transfer tax. Some
illustrations of this area are: a grantor irrevocably assigns the income
of a trust to another for a short period,"'5 the grantor transfers to a
124 Estate of Spiege1 v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949) ; Robinette v. Helver-
ing, 318 U.S. 701 (1943).
125 Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S.
331 (1940).
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trust or to an individual with a power in such entity to pay the
grantor's obligations or insurance premiums,126 or the grantor gives
to one having no substantial adverse interest with a power in such
person to apply the proceeds for the benefits of the grantor's family
or capable of giving the grantor a power to alter, amend, or revoke. 27
5. Split transfers.
In the previous discussion it has been assumed that the transfers
were composed of one taxable interest. The "split transfers" are those
transfers containing one or more taxable interests, each being treated
in a different manner. These involve a number of possibilities which
can best be shown by a simple illustration. Suppose a grantor, "C,"
gives property to "X" for life with a remainder to "Y" and "Z."
Depending upon the identity of "X," "Y" and "Z" there can be a gift
tax on the life estate but not on the remainder, a gift tax on the
remainder but not on the life estate, an income tax on the payments
and a gift tax on the life estate, and several other combinations. 2 s
This is a difficult area in which to apply the transfer tax, especially
when problems of a termination of the marriage are added to the gen-
eral problem. This area alone is worth a study the size of this one, so
I shall simply indicate generally how the tax will work and will leave
the details to a later draftsman.
The transfer tax would be imposed on all the non-income producing
parts of the transfer at the time of the transfer. The tax on the income
producing interest would become due when the income incidence
shifted and would be based on the value of the interest at the time of
the shift. Where the grantor is still paying an income tax, each incre-
inent of income would be considered as a gift by him to the recipient
and would therefore make him liable for a transfer tax.'29 The writer
realizes this rough outline will not answer every detailed question, but
these principles will form a guide for the taxing of every possible
transfer.
6. Special provisions.
There are several areas within the tax law which do not involve
126 1NT. REV. CODE §§ 167 (a), (b), (c); see Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 716
(1943).
127 U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a) (21) (D) (1943) ; estate tax: Commissioner
v. Irving Trust Co., 147 F. 2d 946 (C.A. 2d 1945) ; gift tax: Herzog v. Commis-
sioner, 116 F. 2d 591 (C.A. 2d 1941).
128 This term is used by DeWind, note 103, supra, at p. 101, and it refers to those
transfers which are split into two or more taxable interests.
,'9 In case of split transfers for which the income tax incidence shifts, the transfer
will be treated the same as though the transfer were wholly complete and not "split."
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income taxation and they are provided for in special sections under
present law. The most obvious of these are settled property (powers
of appointment), property unexpectedly returning to the grantor, and
insurance. The problems involved in these fields are so intricate that
a full discussion is obviously beyond the scope of this paper. Briefly
the following is suggested as a general scheme. "Settled property"
provisions which have previously enabled a testator to pass property
down through several generations of unknown relatives with the pay-
ment of a single tax through use of powers of appointment should be
limited so that each time property is passed to someone other than his
widow, by any means, a tax is paid on that transfer. The writer real-
izes that a great social debate is taking place on this subject and does
not wish to hang the benefits of transfer taxation on this one contro-
versal issue, but would hasten. to point out to the advocates of the
"settled property system" that this suggested revision can handle
"settled property" in conformity with the present law.
Property returning to the marital unit is a problem only.when it
returns "unexpectedly" as in the case of gift that fails. It is believed
the present tests of what constitutes an "effective transfer" would pro-
vide a fair solution. If an "effective" transfer has taken place, a tax is
due because the basic purpose of making the gift has been accom-
plished, and since the marital unit can now transfer the property again
it should be considered a second gift. Again this problem should be
thrashed out by Congress and settled according to the political tenor
of the times.
Any transfer tax solution will need a special section devoted to in-
surance to correspond with the present Internal Revenue Code's in-
surance provisions. This field is a subject within itself but certain
principles to be applied to transfer taxation are clear. Insurance cre-
ates an unusual asset which has a partial value during the life of the
insured, and a different value when post-death benefits are considered.
Also the so-called "ownership" of the policy can depend on a series of
factors such as who pays premiums, who can choose the beneficiaries,
who can assign the cash values and many others. All of these cannot be
discussed, but the following general scheme is recommended. All
"incidents" such as payment of premiums, receipt of benefits, and
assigning of interests which take place within the marital unit shall be
tax free in line with exempting all interspousal transfers. Any trans-
fers of insurance value such as payment of premiums on insurance,
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rights going outside the marital unit, or transfers of beneficial interest
to someone outside the marital unit should be considered as transfers
by the marital unit and taxed on the "fair market value" of the right
which the marital unit transfers. If it is impossible to tell whether the
insurance rights are to go outside of the marital unit, taxation should
be postponed until it is possible to determine the answer; then the
above principles of taxing all transfers going outside the marital com-
munity and exempting those within should apply. Admittedly, this is a
great glossing over of a lengthy technical field, but a detailed analysis
of this topic will have to wait until another day.
D. Transition from the Present Law to the New Transfer Tax:
For unmarried individuals no special provisions are necessary since
the transfer tax will start to apply to them only upon subsequent
marriage. Individuals previously married, but single at the date of
the act either through divorce or the death of a spouse, would be
treated the same as individuals who had never been married. In both
cases the regular estate and gift taxes will continue to apply to them
until a new marriage is consummated. At the time of such marriage the
transfer tax would apply to them in the same manner as to all other
married individuals.
Individuals married at the time of passage of the act present more
difficult problems of transition since they have already been taxed at
varying rates upon their marital gifts. To force them to cumulate all
transfers since June 7, 1932130 would mean they paid a tax at a much
higher rate upon their final transfers than an individual not covered
by the transfer tax who starts his basis at zero for the estate tax. This
discrepancy will always exist, but these spouses have not had the
advantages of the transfer tax exclusions and exemptions, and unless
some relief is given they will be paying a greater total tax than any
other group. 3' A possible solution is to create all marital units as of
January first of the year in which the statute is passed. This retro-
active application will prevent any hurried marriages or divorces to
obtain or avoid application of the new act; at the same time it will
create all marital units as of one date so that prior marital transfers
would not cause increased taxation. The marriages already in existence
would create their "point on the cumulative rate schedule" as of
130 The date of enactment of the present gift tax statute.
131 See Treasury proposal, note 103, suipra, at pp. 54 to 60 for a more complete dis-
cussion of the transitional problems involved.
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January 1, 1953 in the same manner as though they were married on
that date; thus they will pay the same tax on their total'transfers
whether or not they have given away the bulk of their estate before
enactment. 32 It is true there will be a bunching of tax liability at the
termination of the marital unit, but this should not be harmful because
the widow has already been protected by a complete exclusion and
the children are protected by the $60,000 exemption.
As between married and unmarried individuals there is a dis-
crepancy due to the estate tax again starting at zero, but several fac-
tors operate to cancel this advantage. First, the estate tax rates are
much higher than those of the transfer tax. Second, there is no com-
plete exemption for one set of donees as exists between husband and
wife. Third, the estate tax is predicated on the gross estate while the
transfer tax is on the net transfers which means no "tax on a tax" is
being paid. Fourth, and final, many inter vivos gifts may be included
in the gross estate, thus increasing the size of the estate in spite of the
decedent's efforts to give it away. Taken all together it may be cheaper
tax-wise for the individual to get marriedl
E. Summary of the Results Produced by a Transfer Tax on the
Marital Unit.
The provisions of the proposed revision are not as simple as might
be desired. With the exception of the provisions relating to the inter
vivos termination of the marital community the proposed tax is fair,
simple, and can be followed without danger of stumbling into technical
pitfalls."' The chief benefits of such an act will be to provide "tax
neutrality" as to the time and manner of transfer,'" produce tax
equality between the community property and common law spouses,
encourage protection of. the wife before giving to the children, and
produce unit estate taxation of what is in fact a social, economic, and
historical unit by utilizing a technique similar to that successfully
employed by draftsmen of the present income tax. The burden of
182 This assumes that the transfer and gift tax rates are the same and that 1932 is
kept as the first date of accumulation. The only difference in tax will be the savings
previously made under the gift tax by making a series of "excluded" $3,000 gifts not
allowed via the transfer tax.
1s The proposed solution avoids the problems of contemplation of death, gift tax
credits, the terminable interest rule, the unidentified asset exclusion, computation of
50 per cent of "the adjusted gross estate," and involuntary shifting of the community
property laws. This list is not exhaustive but does indicate how simplification is being
produced.
184 Except in so far as protection of the wife is concerned, which is considered an
important social benefit.
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death taxation will be shifted from the widow to the children, but
this does no more than follow the accepted American philosophy of
taxing accumulated wealth being passed to the next generation. Inter
vivos gifts will be removed from their favored position, but are not
deterred since they are taxed in the same fashion as testamentary
dispositions. This seems to be a beneficial result, because with this tax
neutrality a grantor can decide, without tax pressure, whether he
wants to favor the prodigal son during life or bind him to the family
until the parents' death. The psychological reasons for making gifts
are to a great extent unknown, and it is submitted this is a field
wherein the donor should be allowed to decide for himself whether or
not he desires to make an inter vivos as opposed to a testamentary gift.
CONCLUSION
This article's purpose is to provide a means of transition from our
present out-moded system of death taxation to a new system of inte-
grated transfer taxation. This system can be placed in the present
statute without causing any major dislocation of established taxing
concepts, and will produce a fairer and simpler tax impact on the
marital community. At first blush, this plan may seem to involve
radical changes, but an examination of its chief features will reveal
that it merely extends existing ideas of family taxation.
It is impossible to construct any practical solution that will cover
every possible problem, and this plan does not purport to do so. It is
submitted to be however, a sound blueprint for a fair tax system which
will improve as judicial decisions and legislative amendments place
their imprint upon it. This is not a final solution and the writer hopes
it will never be considered as such, for an effective law must be a
living statute which changes to meet the changing needs of society.
It is desired that this proposal shall become a part of a changing tax
statute which will become both simpler and fairer as it is stripped to
its basic premises by judicial interpretation.
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